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The Debate on Current Theories of Colonial Discourse 
Abstract 
In a recent article entitled 'Problems in Current Theories of Colonial Discourse', 1 Benita Parry is critical of 
the recent trend in contemporary anticolonialist criticism to 'disown work done within radical traditions 
other than the most recently enunciated heterodoxies' .2 In her opinion the contemporary taste for 'theory' 
has led to the down-grading of the antiimperialist discourses of colonial liberation movements begun in 
the 1950s, and in particular the 'exemplary and exceptional radical stance' of Fanon. And she warns that 
this development may result in a criticism which is unable to withstand the force of the dominant order. In 
taking up such a position, Parry claims to be siding with critics such as Edward Said and Abdul Jan 
Mohamed, for whom resistance requires not a return to a transparent realism, but an oppositional stance 
(she is particularly impressed by Jan Mohamed's theory of Manichean aesthetics)? and to be distancing 
herself from critics like Homi Bhabha and Gayatri Spivak, who confine themselves to the purely negative 
task of deconstructing the texts of colonialism. 
This journal article is available in Kunapipi: https://ro.uow.edu.au/kunapipi/vol13/iss3/17 
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ANNE MAXWELL 
The Debate on Current Theories of 
Colonial Discourse 
In a recent article entitled 'Problems in Current Theories of Colonial Dis-
course',1 Benita Parry is critical of the recent trend in contemporary anti-
colonialist criticism to 'disown work done within radical traditions other 
than the most recently enunciated heterodoxies' .2 In her opinion the 
contemporary taste for 'theory' has led to the down-grading of the anti-
imperialist discourses of colonial liberation movements begun in the 1950s, 
and in particular the 'exemplary and exceptional radical stance' of Fanon. 
And she warns that this development may result in a criticism which is 
unable to withstand the force of the dominant order. In taking up such a 
position, Parry claims to be siding with critics such as Edward Said and 
Abdul Jan Mohamed, for whom resistance requires not a return to a trans-
parent realism, but an oppositional stance (she is particularly impressed 
by Jan Mohamed's theory of Manichean aesthetics)? and to be distancing 
herself from critics like Horni Bhabha and Gayatri Spivak, who confine 
themselves to the purely negative task of deconstructing the texts of colo-
nialism. 
Spivak is the main target of Parry's disapproval. In particular, Parry is 
critical of Spivak's obliteration of the role of the native 'as historical 
subject and combatant, possessor of another knowledge and producer of 
alternative traditions';4 for in Parry's view it is the appeal to the equal 
aspects of native tradition which furnishes the colonized with an alternat-
ive representational framework or form of language from which to fashion 
a combatant subjectivity or self. Such a figure, she argues, is represented 
by the character of Christophine, the recalcitrant black native woman in 
Jean Rhys's Wide Sargasso Sea.5 According to Parry, Spivak 'misconstrues' 
Christophine, seeing her as only a tangential figure whose image is con-
flated with that of the similarly marginalized character of Antoinette, the 
white Creole woman who is also 'native' to the colonies. Interpreted thus, 
Christophine is effectively silenced by the epistemic violence of imperial-
ism, her presence merely serving to mark the limits of the European text. 
By way of contrast to this explication of Christophine as an unknown, be-
cause silenced entity, Parry gives her the status of both speaking subject 
and interpreter who acts to disrupt it.6 In this respect, she judges Spivak's 
approach to be even less radically subversive than Bhabha's; for he at least 
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offers the colonized some hope of being able to challenge colonial author-
ity through the mimicry of colonial discourse. This is 'a mode of contra-
dictm;y utterance that ambivalently re-inscribes both colonizer and colon-
ized'. Despite this distinction, however, Parry remains generally critical 
of Bhabha's stance. After all, as Bhabha himself concedes, 'The place of 
differences and otherness, or the space of the adversarial, within such a 
system of "disposal" as I've proposed, is never entirely on the outside or 
implacably oppositional' .8 
This brings me to Parry's second complaint against Bhabha's and 
Spivak's methods- their refusal of a Manichean discourse based on binary 
oppositions. Hence her observation that their narratives of colonialism 
serve to 'obscure the "murderous and decisive struggle between two prot-
agonists", and discount or write out the counter-discourses which every 
liberation movement records' .9 What is being targeted here is the purely 
'deconstructive' nature of their critical approach - its decision to do no 
more than 'place incendiary devices within the dominant structures of rep-
resentation and not to confront these with another knowledge' .10 This is 
a failure which is reflected in a further weakness of their work, namely its 
'exorbitation of discourse and a related incuriosity about the enabling 
socicreconomic and political institutions and other forms of social praxis' .11 
In short, the charge is that their use of deconstruction is a narrowly 
'textualist' one which does not allow for any point outside of discourse 
from which concrete forms of opposition can be marshalled. Not surpris-
ingly, Parry is also highly critical of both Bhabaha's and Spivak's dis-
solving of the binary opposition colonizer I colonized in favour of a much 
less differentiated concept.12 The power of this opposition, she argues, lies 
precisely in its ability to recover humanism's idea of the unified self. As 
against this, deconstruction has little more to offer than 'a silent place laid 
waste by imperialism's epistemic violence, or an agonistic space within 
which unequally placed contestants negotiate an imbalance of power'.13 
To summarize, what Parry is attacking is the critic's refusal to attribute 
to the colonized a unified consciousness or speaking voice which will en-
able him or her to stand in unmitigated antagonism to the oppressor. This 
is the result of an inordinate preoccupation with 'theory , and in particular 
deconstruction's critique of the sovereign subject. Instead, Parry believes 
that critics should be concentrating on articulating the margins, and gain-
ing control of the way in which the marginalized are represented. This is 
to take seriously Said's claim that feminism, black, ethnic and anti-
imperialist studies all rest similarly upon one ethiccrdiscursive principle, 
'the right of formerly un- or misrepresented human groups to speak for 
and represent themselves in domains defined, politically and intellectually, 
as normally excluding them, usurping their signifying and representing 
functions, over-riding their historical reality' .14 
Parry's position is admirable in its intent, but is surely not without its 
own problems, the most serious of which are her quarrel with deconstruc-
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tion or 'theory', and her perception of the colonized as being the holder 
of an authentic, sovereign voice. But let us start with her quarrel with 
deconstruction or 'theory'. The idea that deconstruction reflects a failure 
to connect textual subversions to concrete forms of struggle in the world 
appears to be an example of what Homi Bhabha has condemned as 'the 
damaging and self-defeating assumption ... that theory is necessarily the 
elite language of the socially and culturally privileged'.15 For according to 
him, it is part of this heterodoxy that '[t]he Olympian realms of what is 
mistakenly labelled "pure theory'' are assumed to be eternally insulated 
from the historical exigencies and tragedies of the wretched of the earth' .16 
Bhabha's defence of theory rests on its ability to reveal or analyse the pro-
cesses involved in the ideological production of representational images. 
He argues that the categorical distinction between practice and theory, or 
politics and text, overlooks the metaphorical and rhetorical force of writing 
as 'a productive matrix which defines the "social" and makes it available 
as an objective of/for action'. Hence, '[t]extuality is not simply a second-
order ideological expression or a verbal symptom of a pre-given political 
subject' ;17 it too can be a force for social change. Indeed, for Bhabha, 
theory has more to offer in the way of hope for the oppressed than the 
sort of criticism which attempts to resurrect the rigid binary oppositions 
which inform 'identity', for what must never be forgotten is that the latter 
carries with it its own legacy of violence: 
Must we always polarize in order to polemicize? Are we trapped in a politics of 
struggle where the representation of social antagonisms and historical contradictions 
can take no other form than a binarism of theory vs. politics? Can the aim of free-
dom or knowledge be the simple inversion of the relation of oppressor and op-
pressed, margin and periphery, negative image and positive image? Is our only way 
out of such dualism the espousal of an implacable oppositionality or the invention 
of an originary counter-myth of radical purity? Must the project of our liberationist 
aesthetics be for ever part of a totalizing, Utopian vision of Being and History that 
seeks to transcend the contradictions and ambivalences that constitute the very 
structure of human subjectivity and its systems of cultural representation?11 
Here, Bhabha is exploding the myth of the 'transparency' of the human 
agent and the reasonableness of political action at the heart of the liberal 
tradition. In contrast to this stark concept of politics, whose space can only 
be Right or Left, theory opens up the ambivalent and phantasmic texts 
that make 'the political' possible: 
The language of critique is effective ... to the extent to whlch it overcomes the given 
grounds of opposition and opens up a space of 'translation'; a place of hybridity, 
figuratively speaking, where the construction of a political object that is new, neither 
the one nor the Other, properly alienates our political expectations, and changes, as 
it must, the very forms of our recognition of the 'moment' of politics.19 
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For the radical critic, the advantage of theory lies in its being able to pre-
vent a relationship of simple identity forming between the political object-
ive and its means of representation. In denying an essentialist logic and 
a mimetic referent to political representation, it cuts through the moralism 
that usually accompanies political separatism. In this sense, its impact can 
be described as ideological. This is not to deny the importance of more 
overtly material or political forms of anti-colonial struggle: theory cannot 
of itself substitute for these. Rather, it is to challenge the belief that theory 
is not a radically subversive force. 
Though for the most part Parry appeals to a Manichean model of ident-
ity, and thereby carefully avoids the slide toward essentialism, there are 
nevertheless moments when her argument hinges on the notion of authen-
ticity. One such moment is her appeal to native culture as the platform 
from which a recalcitrant identity can be fashioned. This appeal is, I 
would suggest, responsible for her misconstruction of Bhabha's project. 
Take, for example, her assertion that 'by showing the wide range of 
stereotypes and the shifting subject positions assigned to the colonized in 
the colonialist text, [Bhabha] sets out to liberate the colonial from its 
debased inscription as Europe's monolithic and shackled Other, and into 
an autonomous native "difference"' .2!) Or consider her subsequent conclu-
sion that, in Bhabha's work 'the subaltern has spoken, and his readings of 
the colonialist text recover a native voice' .21 I would like to know how we 
can reconcile this idea of the autonomy of the speaking subject not only 
with Bhabha's own theses concerning the ambivalence of colonial dis-
course and the refraction of the subjectivity of both colonizer and colon-
ized, but also with his claim that the only space of resistance on offer to 
the colonized is the mimicry or parody of the speech of the colonizer.22 
A further difficulty occurs with respect to her invocation of Said's con-
cept of oppositional criticism. At first glance, this might seem easy to 
reconcile with her appeal to Fanon's theory of a unified consciousness for 
the colonized, which is collective and stands in unmitigated antagonism 
toward the oppressor. But in fact Said's oppositional criticism 'posits 
"nothing less than new objects of knowledge ... new theoretical models 
that upset or at the very least radically alter the prevailing paradigmatic 
norms"'23 precisely because these are based on an unmitigated antagonism 
and hatred of the Other?4 In appealing to Said's notion of oppositional 
consciousness Parry is therefore ignoring his rejection of the Manichean 
discourse adopted by Fanon. As far as Said is concerned, the destructive 
forms of representation used by both colonizer and colonized alike must 
be replaced by more positive and conciliatory modes which emphasize the 
overlapping of cultural boundaries and the interdependence of the histor-
ical narratives belonging to either side. This would involve abandoning 
fixed ideas of settled identity and culturally authorized definition.25 Said's 
own interpolation of Fanon gives prominence to the latter's vision of a 
new form of identity which recognizes both racial and class equality as 
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well as the idea of the collective.26 This is a reading which emphasizes the 
dialectical nature of Fanon's program of counter-insurgency in order to 
down-play any importance given to a destructive or antagonistic phase 
based on the recovery of native traditions. This is perhaps to be expected 
given Said's idea that nativism invariably gives rise to a ardent practice 
of separatism. 
Both Bhabha's defence of theory and Said's dialectical interpretation of 
Fanon should perhaps serve to warn us that the emphasis which Parry 
places on nativism in her own reading of Fanon may be attributable to an 
unspoken desire to retain the antagonistic paradigms of identity. A careful 
reading of Fanon would lend support to this hypothesis, for it reveals that 
although the appeal to native culture does help to facilitate the production 
of a new self, it never assumes anything like the cardinal role that it does 
in Parry's account. Moreover, in my opinion Said is quite right to give 
more weight to the conciliatory aspects of Fanon's program than to what 
he perceives as its unwonted element of violence, particularly since it is 
Fanon's dream of producing a radically new form of humanism- tolerant 
of heterogeneity - which distinguished his narrative of nationalism from 
the one sustaining European imperialism. But in stressing the placatory 
moments of Fanon's program at the expense of its more dissonant phase, 
it would seem that it is also Said' s intention to dissuade post-colonial 
intellectuals from appealing to an authentic or originary identity. His 
ulterior motive would seem to be to keep the space of the Other from 
being appropriated by the still powerful arm of western imperialism, this 
time round in the form of the dominant narratives of postmodernism. For 
according to Said, despite inroads made by earlier anti-colonialist intel-
lectuals such as C.L.R. James and Fanon, the struggle for control of cul-
tural representation continues unabated today, the latest target for appro-
priation being the 'otherness' or 'difference' of the non-European world.27 
In this connection, Said has drawn our attention to the way in which the 
relentless celebration of 'otherness' and 'difference' by First World intel-
lectuals has reached the status of 'spectacle' , with the unfortunate result 
that Western intellectuals have felt they can continue to blatantly ignore 
the presence of the Third World. As a case in point, he singles out Jean-
Fran~ois Lyotard, who accounts for the phenomenon of postmodernism 
in terms of a loss of the legitimizing power of the great narratives of 
emancipation and Enlightenment, and their replacement by smaller local 
narratives legitimated by their users' ability to manipulate the codes in 
order to get things done.28 According to Said this is an explanation which 
shows Lyotard to be guilty of separating Western postmodernism from the 
non-European world, and from the consequences of European modernism 
and modernization in the colonized world. For Said, Lyotard's narrative 
represents the culminating stage of a process of relentless aestheticization 
and sterilization of modernism - a dynamic which can be traced through 
Albert Camus's version of Algeria. For in stark contrast to Fanon's Arabs, 
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those of lA Peste and L'Etranger are 'nameless beings used as background 
for the portentous European metaphysics explored by Camus, who, we 
should recall, in his Cronique algerienne denied the existence of an Algerian 
nation'.29 
In place of the intrinsically one-sided, or ethnocentric accounts proffered 
by intellectuals such as Lyotard, Said would like to see narratives which 
take the Third World seriously by placing what it has to say on equal 
terms with its own explanations. The current dearth of such material with-
in the First World can be attributed to a failure on the part of its present-
day intellectuals to attend to the fuller global context in which the West's 
ideological productions occur - something which Said believes is being 
covered over by the vogue for 'thick descriptions and blurred genres' 
which only act to 'shut and block out the clamor of voices on the outside 
asking for their claims about empire and domination to be considered' .30 
Nor does he consider that the recovery of this fuller, more responsible per-
spective can be easily achieved. For instance, it isn't a case of exercising 
a politically, or ideologically disinterested form of reason based on aes-
theticism or theory as distinct from ethics or morality; for as history has 
shown this kind of reason always works to the advantage of the West. 
Rather, about the best that responsible critics can do is to uncover the 
political interests concealed behind the rarefied instituUonal practices of 
interpretation produced by their own culture: 
ln short what is now before us nationally, and in the full imperial panorama, is the 
deep, the profoundly perturbed and perturbing question of our relationship to 
others - other cultures, other states, other histories, other experiences, traditions, 
peoples, and destinies. The difficulty with the question is that there is no vantage 
outside the actuality of relationships between cultures, between unequal imperial 
and non-imperial powers, between different Others, a vantage that might allow one 
the epistemological privilege of somehow judging, evaluating, and interpreting free 
of the encumbering interests, emotions, and engagements of the ongoing relation-
ships themselves. When we consider the connections between the United States and 
the rest of the world, we are so to speak of the connections, not outside and beyond 
them. It therefore behooves us as intellectuals, humanists, and secular critics to 
grasp the role of the United States in the world of nations and power, from within 
the actuality, and as participants in it, not as detached outside observers who, like 
Oliver Goldsmith in Yeats' marvellous phrase, deliberately sip at the honeypots of 
our minds.31 
Spivak, also, is highly critical of the current intellectual enterprise of con-
stituting the colonial subject as Other, and in her article 'Can the Subaltern 
Speak?' she cautions post-colonial critics against such an undertaking by 
reminding them that wherever such a subjectivity is theorized by First 
World intellectuals, it is accompanied by the desire to conserve the Subject 
of the West.32 She even ventures to suggest that '[t]he theory of pluralized 
"subject-effects" gives an illusion of undermining subjective sovereignty 
while often providing a cover for this subject of knowledge'. Hence her 
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contention that: 'The much-publicized critique of the sovereign subject 
thus actually inaugurates a Subject'.33 A good example of this kind of cri-
tique is a text entitled 1ntellectuals in Power' by Michel Foucault and 
Gilles Deleuze.34 In her analysis of this text, Spivak points to the inherent 
contradiction in Foucault's and Deleuze's claim concerning the contribu-
tions made by French post-structuralist theory to counter-hegemonic dis-
course. On the one hand they maintain that the networks of power I 
desire/interest are so heterogeneous that their reduction to a coherent 
narrative is counterproductive - which is why a persistent critique is 
needed. On the other hand, insisting that intellectuals must attempt to dis-
close and know Society's Other, they proceed to articulate it in terms 
which are at once Eurocentric (by reducing radical struggle to the 'the 
worker's struggle') and essentialist (by appealing to the empirical reality 
of the worker's 'concrete experience', as is seen in Foucault's claims that 
'the masses know perfectly well', and 'they know far better than [the intel-
lectual] and they certainly say it very well'). As Spivak notes, the latter 
lends support to a positivistic paradigm which in turn forms the justifying 
foundation of an advanced capitalistic neo-colonialism: 'This S/subject, 
curiously sewn together into a transparency by denegations, belongs to the 
exploiters' side of the international division of labour' .35 The source of this 
contradiction, so Spivak argues, lies in a failure to distinguish between 
two different categories of representation: representation as 'speaking for', 
as in politics; and representation as 're-presentation', as in art and philo-
sophy. Thus it is the opposition between 'applied practice' (suggested by 
the appeal to 'concrete experience') and 'pure theory' which conflates the 
two forms and affords the transparency of the intellectual. 
For Spivak, Foucault's effort to locate epistemic violence in the re-
definition of sanity at the end of the European eighteenth century consti-
tutes a powerful instance of the transparency of the intellectual, precisely 
because it fails to rewrite the history of the systematic suppressions and 
marginalizations of Western society since the eighteenth century in accord-
ance with the discourses of 'normativity' effected by imperialism. In other 
words, in Foucault's account what was represented as normal was deemed 
not to be the result of contact with other cultures. What is left out of such 
a version is a whole set of knowledges that have been disqualified as in-
adequate to the taste of First World intellectuals because they are thought 
to be 'insufficiently elaborated: naive knowledge, located low down on the 
hierarchy, beneath the required level of cognition or scientificity'.36 Such 
an attitude, Spivak contends, is oblivious to the possibility that European 
intellectuals can never 'know' the non-European in any way other than 
through the prism of their own desires: 
It is impossible for contemporary French intellectuals to imagine the kind of Power 
and Desire that would inhabit the unnamed subject of the Other of Europe. It is not 
only that everything they read, critical or uncritical, is caught within the debate of 
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the production of that Other, supporting or critiquing the constitution of the Subject 
as Europe. It is also that, in the constitution of the Other of Europe, great care was 
taken to obliterate the textual ingredients with which such a subject could cathect, 
could occupy (invest?) its itinerary- not only by ideological and scientific produc-
tion, but also by the institution of the law.31 
To ask therefore what happens to the critique of the sovereign subject 
when it is applied to the knowledge of society's Other leads to the realiza-
tion that, in representing the subaltern, intellectuals represent themselves 
as transparent. This is another way of saying that the western project to 
constitute the colonial subject as Other itself constitutes an instance of 
epistemic violence. 
If Said's and Spivak's views are to be taken seriously, then surely we 
must ask ourselves if Parry's desire to rescue the native woman subject 
from out of the quiescence imposed on her by recent criticism has more 
in common with the sort of epistemic violence which Spivak has just been 
describing than with the 'exceptional stance' of Fanon. As Parry herself 
has noted, her own objective is in marked contrast to the position taken 
up by Spivak, in whose writings the native subject is historically muted 
as a result of 'the planned epistemic violence of the imperialist project', 
where the native was prevailed upon to internalize as self-knowledge the 
knowledge concocted by the master. This required of the native that here-
write his position as object of imperialism by domesticating the alien as 
Master and himself as a self-consolidating and silent Other, a process 
which brought about the European 'worlding' of the native's own world. 
Hence the following premise: 
No perspective critical of imperialism can tum the Other into a self, because the 
project of imperialism has always already historically refracted what might have 
been the absolutely Other into a domesticated Other that consolidates the imperial-
ist self .... A full literary inscription cannot easily flourish in the imperialist fracture 
of discontinuity, covered over by an alien legal system masquerading as Law as 
such, an alien ideology established as only truth, and a set of human sciences busy 
establishing the 'native' as self-consoHdating Other.38 
If this is true of the native in a general sense then it is doubly true for the 
native as woman. Spivak's observation that 'One never encounters the 
testimony of the women's voice-consciousness', 'There is no space from 
where the subaltern (sexed) subject can speak', 'The subaltern as female 
cannot be heard or read', and 'The subaltern cannot speak'39 is derived 
from studying the discourse of Sati, in which the Hindu patriarchal code 
converged with colonialism's narrativization of Indian culture to efface all 
traces of woman's voice. This study could conceivably be used as a start-
ing point for a critique of Fanon's reinscription of native culture as 
demonstrated by his story of the haik. Just as the tradition of widow sacri-
fice became a battleground for the competing discourses of Hindu patri-
archy and imperialist culture - a terrain from which the voice of the 
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subaltern woman was excluded- so it is possible that Algerian women 
had little or no say in clashes between the revolutionaries and the French 
government over the wearing of the vei1.40 A critique developed along 
these lines could prove an embarrassment to Parry's attempt to rescue the 
notion of an autonomous speaking voice and unified subjectivity for the 
native or subaltern woman based on a revival of elements belonging to the 
traditional native culture. 
The omission of women from the formation of both traditional and re-
volutionary forms of culture is not the only aspect of Fanon's work which 
could serve to compromise Parry's argument. In ascribing to traditional 
native culture the power to generate a new identity for the colonized, 
Parry is seriously violating the spirit of Fanon's whole critique of nativism. 
For Fanon, native culture had but a transitional part to play in the revolu-
tionary process. Indeed, its only role was in the second phase of liberation 
- the moment when the native, discovering that 'the settler's skin is not 
of any more value than a native's skin', turns away from the values of the 
colonizing culture and comes into touch again with those of his own 
people. Here, in contrast to the 'individualism' and 'egoism' of the settler, 
the native rediscovers the strength to be gained from communal ideals. 
This is the power of unity contained in 'the substance of village 
assemblies, the cohesion of people's committees, and the extraordinary 
fruitfulness of local meetings and groupments'. Above all, it is this new 
found communalism which forms the basis of the political cohesion of the 
colonized: 'Henceforward, the interest of one will be the interests of all, 
for in concrete fact e:veryone will be discovered by the troops, e:veryone will 
be massacred - or e:veryone will be saved. The motto "look out for 
yourself', the atheist's method of salvation, is in this context forbidden.'41 
But what is being insinuated here is that bourgeois individualism isn't the 
only enemy of liberation; it is also those aspects of traditional native 
culture, such as tribalism and chieftainship, which because of their 
inherently hierarchical qualities have proved to be compatible with the 
colonizer's culture: 
The colonial system encourages chieftaindes and keeps alive the old Mara bout con-
fraternities. Violence is in action all-inclusive and national. It follows that it is 
closely involved in the liquidation of regionalism and of tribalism. Thus the national 
parties show no pity all towards the caids and the customary chiefs. Their destruc-
tion is the preliminary to the unification of the people.42 
Fanon has to get rid of these features of the native's pre-colonial past be-
cause they contravene the notion that one can determine one's own future. 
For that, an entirely new belief system is needed, based on the concrete 
reality of the present, or the common experience of confronting death at 
the hands of the colonizer. Hence his pronouncement that: 
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After centuries of unreality, after having wallowed in the most outlandish phan-
toms, at long last the native, gun in hand, stands face to face with the only forces 
which contend for his life- the forces of colonialism And the youth of a colonized 
country, growing up in an atmosphere of shot and fire, may well make a mock of, 
and does not hesitate to pour scorn upon the zombies of his ancestors, the horses 
with two heads, the dead who rise again, and the dijnns who rush into your body 
while you yawn. The native discovers reality and transforms it into the gattem of 
his customs, into the practice of violence and into his plan for freedom. 
The place of nativism in Fanon's decolonization program, then, is one of 
subordination to a revolutionary new culture which in its 'fight against 
poverty, illiteracy and underdevelopment'44 is unashamedly modem and 
progressivist. Here is how Christopher Miller puts it: 'Fanon allows the 
look backward into tradition, but only to the extent that it is "in the 
intention of opening the future, as an invitation to action and as a basis of 
hope" .' 45 Thus Fa non was in fact undermining the force of traditional 
native culture by brandishing a completely new type of identity based on 
progressivist Marxist principles. Only where traditional native culture 
undergoes a radical transformation and takes on new meaning is it con-
ceived of as contributing to the fashioning of such an identity. 
Of course it's always possible that Parry's gloss on Fanon's use of native 
culture may be deliberate. Miller, for example, has pointed out that one 
of the most serious problems with Fanon's theory of a new national cul-
ture based on Marxist precepts is that it has provided the inspiration for 
the heinous crimes of Guinea's tyrannical leader 5ekou Toure. And he 
adds that the problem of Marxism's clash with ethnidty is nowhere more 
obvious than in Fanon's dream of imposing a modern form of rationalism 
on Africa; for here it can be seen that what is meant to liberate people 
from the fetters of colonialism is imperialism in another guise. 
Briefly, I would submit that Fa non's use of the word 'nation' covers over important 
unresolved tensions between ethnicity and ethics: by placing the word at the center 
of his concern for evolution, without questioning the complexities of its application 
to different geographical and cultural environments, Fanon winds up imposing his 
own idea of nation in places where it may need reappraising. As David Caute has 
accurately pointed out, 'It is curious that Fanon, who wanted to snap the bonds of 
European culture, should have transformed arbitrary European structures into the 
natural units of African progress'. Far from being 'natural national entities' or 
cohesive nation-states, the modem nations of black Africa must make do with bor-
ders created to satisfy European power brokering in the 'scramble for Africa', bor-
ders that violate rather than reinforce units of culture.46 
Miller's is both a powerful and persuasive critique of Fa non's progressivist 
concept of nationalism, and it raises important moral questions concerning 
the destruction of native or ethnic culture when anti-colonialist resistance 
acquires a Marxist mien. But even if Parry's interpretation of Fanon is 
based on such a concern, there is still reason to be wary of those forms of 
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western intellectualism which exhort ethnicity. Spivak, for one, has noted 
that: 'In the United States the third-worldism currently afloat in human-
istic disciplines is often openly ethnic' .47 And she cautions that a nostalgia 
for lost origins can be detrimental to the exploration of social realities 
within the critique of imperialism.48 That Spivak places Parry in this cat-
egory seems clear from her own assessment of the latter's project. Parry's 
criticisms, she says, are 'well meaning' but compromised by her insertion 
into the nineteenth-century anthropological mode; that is to say she is still 
caught within a system of belief which privileges 'the native informant', 
as if there is still a pure native voice to be heard.49 Included under the 
rubric of third-worldism is the feminist project to constitute the native 
subject as Other. That Parry might be party to such a practice is suggested 
by her own thesis that: 'What Spivak's strategy of reading necessarily blots 
out is Christophine's inscription as the native, female individual Self [my 
emphasis] who defies the demands of the discriminatory discourses im-
pinging on her person'.50 For this reference to the individual self places 
Parry fairly and squarely within First World feminist discourse, something 
which I believe is reinforced by her subsequent declaration that 'it should 
be possible to locate traces and testimony of women's voice[s) on those 
sites where women inscribed themselves as healers, ascetics, singers of 
sacred songs'.51 Such a proposal betrays the influence of a western femin-
ism which attempts to articulate a separate women's identity for western 
and non-western women alike through the recovery of a separate female 
tradition, while ignoring its own privileged positioning on the other side 
of the international division of labour. 
Caught between the coercions of a totalizing counter-discourse of 
national liberation, and the epistemic violence implicit in the project of 
speaking for the colonial subject, what forms of resistance remain open to 
the subaltern woman? Having exposed the tacit imperialism behind the 
post-structuralist project of knowing and disclosing society's Other, Spivak 
admits that the critic is still left with the problem of what constitutes a 
more recuperable project than the 'clandestine restoration of subjective 
essentialism'. For an answer she looks to traditional Marxist theory and 
in particular to the critique of the individual as oppressed subject. Here 
the two different categories of representation referred to earlier are not 
conflated. Class consciousness consequently remains attached to the feel-
ing of community that belongs to national links and political organiza-
tions, and not to that other experience of desire whose structural model 
is the family. Thus full class agency (if there were such a thing) is not an 
ideological transformation of consciousness on the ground level, a desiring 
identity of the agents and their interest, an identity whose absence 
troubles Foucault and Deleuze. Hence Spivak's view is that a radical prac-
tice should attend to what she describes as Marx's 'double session' of rep-
resentations rather than introduce the individual subject through totalizing 
concepts of power and desire.52 Put more simply, it should insist on the 
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distinction between the plurality of subject-effects adduced by art and 
philosophy and the conscious subject of politics. She is also of the view 
that the critic would do well to follow Marx's example in keeping the area 
of class practices on the second level of abstraction (as distinct from the 
stage of 'concrete experience'), for by doing this Marx effectively kept 
open the I<antian (and Hegelian) critique of the individual subject as agent 
of history. And she further notes: 1t does seem to me that Marx's ques-
tioning of the individual as agent of history should be read in the context 
of the breakin§ up of the individual subject inaugurated by Kant's reading 
of Descartes'. All of this represents a solution compatible with the post-
structuralist critique of the sovereign Subject. 
For Spivak, what remains useful in Foucault is what she calls the mech-
anics of 'disciplinarization and institutionalization', the constitution, as it 
were, of the colonizer. This, she believes, can be used to much greater 
analytic and interventionist advantage than his invocations of the authen-
ticity of the Other. In a similar vein to this kind of work is Spivak's own 
attempt to develop a strategy of reading that will 'speak to', as distinct 
from 'speaking for', the historically muted subaltern woman. 
In seeking to learn to speak to (rather than listen to or speak for) the historically 
muted subject of the subaltern woman, the post-colonial intellectual systematically 
'unlearns' female privilege. This systematic unlearning involves learning to critique 
post-colonial discourse with the best tools it can provide and not simply substitut-
ing the lost figure of the colonized.54 
Given that Parry's complaints against Spivak include her ignoring of the 
methods of liberation of the 1950s, it is ironical that Spivak alone endeav-
ours to return post-colonial criticism to a Marxist notion of consciousness. 
Her aim here is mainly to take the emphasis off an individualist concept 
of freedom so as to return anti-colonial struggle to its roots in collective 
as well as political and economic freedom. The individualist concept of 
freedom is something adhered to by both Parry and western 'culture' 
critics in general, and would appear to have been developed out of 
Fanon's theories on the phenomenological self.55 
To summarize, recent debates are divided on the issues of whether or 
not the post-colonial intellectual should be engaged in the attempt to re-
cover an autonomous form of subjectivity for the Others of Europe that 
will allow them to 'speak for themselves.' Such a view would have it that: 
'The current post-structuralist/post-modern challenges to the coherent, 
autonomous subject have to be put on hold in feminist and post-colonial 
discourses, for both must work first to assert and affirm a denied or 
alienated subjectivity.'56 Vying with this argument is the one which 
believes that the theorizing of an autonomous subject for the colonized 
ministers to the desire of First World intellectuals to know and thereby 
control the Other of the West. Faced with this prospect, the most that 
post-colonial intellectuals can hope to do is to continue critiquing the 
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subject of the West. This is the position taken by Spivak who has argued 
that: 
If instead we concentrated on documenting and theorizing the itinerary of the con-
solidation of Europe as sovereign subject, indeed sovereign and subject, then we 
would produce an alternative historical narrative of the 'worlding' of what is today 
called 'the Third World'. To think of the Third World as distant cultures, exploited 
but with rich intact heritages waiting to be recovered, interpreted, and curricular-
ized in English translation helps the emergence of the 'Third World' as a signifier 
that allows us to forget that 'worlding,' even as it expands the empire of the 
disci pline.57 
The ground covered by this article represents what remains today of the 
challenge to both colonial and neo-colonial forms of representation prof-
fered by Fanon. The shifts which have taken place in the interim period 
would have to include the attempt on behalf of Western intellectuals to 
restore themselves to a position of global supremacy through the deploy-
ment of increasingly subtle methods of cultural appropriation, as weU as 
the efforts of post-colonial intellectuals to respond in equally wily fashion. 
What the outcome of these changes will be is very hard to predict; the 
ground I have just covered, for instance, serves only to confirm that the 
space of representation opened up by Fanon is still being hotly contested. 
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